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City Club
Research Study
Committee Recommends "NO" on 95
Your Committee I ound:
Measure f).i would dramatically change ilie leacher
compensalioii system in Oregon. Currently, leacher pa\ is based
on seniority and education level. .Nationally, some school
districts and slates have begun to experiment with other
approaches, but only recently and to a very limited extent. None
tie individual teacher pay direcliy and solely to student
performance.
Measure 9."> would require the development of an extensive and
costly testing system. Tests would have to be developed for and
administered to even class of students in every subject area
from kindergarten through graduate school. While the new
system would cost millions to develop and operate, it is not clear
that it would improve student performance.
Some committee members think the genera! concept of
rewinding teachers for their effectiveness in the classroom is
worth exploring. I low ever, to be successful any reforms must be
the product of a collaborative process thai includes teachers,
administrators, and school boards: must include an effective and
credible assessment system; and must receive adequate and
reliable funding.
linally the Oregon Constitution, our state's fundamental
governing document, is no place for detailed instructions on
how teachers should be paid.
Your committee unanimously recommends a "NO" vole on
Measure H.l.

The City Club membership will vote on this report on Friday, October 27, 2000. Until
the membership vote, the City Club of Portland does not have an official position on
this report. The vote outcome will be reported in the Bulletin dated Nov. 10, 2000.

Oregon State Ballot Measure 95:
Teacher Pay Determined by Student Performance

CITY CLUB OF PORTLAND BALLOT MEASURE STUDY
I. INTRODUCTION
Ballot Measure 95 will appear on the ballot as follows:

Caption:

AMENDS CONSTITUTION: STUDENT
LEARNING DETERMINES TEACHER PAY
QUALIFICATIONS NOT SENIORITY

Result of "Yes" Vole:

"Yes" \ole requires student learning, not
seniority, determines teacher pay;
qualifications, sluuVnl learning determine
retention.

Result of "No" Vote:

"No" vole retains current laws for paying,
retaining teachers by qualifications, including
performance, education, seniority.

Summ.'irv:

Amends Constitution. Currently, seniority and
postgraduate study may determine public
school teacher pay, job security. Measure
requires public school teacher's pay, job
security to be based on increase in students'
appropriate knowledge while under teacher's
instruction. Allows performance-based pay
increases, certain across-the-board cost-ofliving increases, retention of most qualified
teacher of subject when layoffs occur. Prohibits
automatic pay increases, job retention based
on seniority. Applies to new or extended
collective bargaining agreements signed
on/after November 7, 2000.

(The language of the caption, question, and summary was prepared by
the Oregon Attorney General and amended by the Oregon Supreme
Court.)
The City Club created our committee to review Measure 95 and to
recommend a position on the measure to the City Club general membership.
City Club screened committee members for conflicts of interest to ensure
that no member had an economic interest in the outcome of the study or
was publicly identified with an existing position on the study topic.
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Committee members met twice weekly during late September and early
October. Committee members interviewed Measure 95 proponents and
opponents, teachers, and school administrators. Committee members also
reviewed an extensive collection of relevant articles, reports, and other
materials.
What Would Measure 95 Do?
Measure 95 is a citizen initiative that would amend the Oregon Constitution.
Measure 95 would prohibit the current system of paying teachers based on
their number of years of service and level of education. Instead, Measure 95
would require that teacher pay be based only on "the degree to which the
appropriate knowledge of the teacher's students increased while under his or
her instruction."
Measure 95 would prohibit automatic teacher pay increases based on
seniority or additional college courses or degrees. The measure would allow
school districts to give teachers across the board cost-of-living pay increases,
as long as the increase does not exceed the increase in the consumer price
index and the teachers' base pay is based on performance not seniority.
Schools and school districts sometimes need to lay off teachers. Under the
current system, teachers with the fewest years of service usually are the first
to be laid off. Measure 95 would prohibit school districts from considering
years of service when deciding which teachers to lay off.
Measure 95 would take effect in each school district when a new collective
bargaining agreement is negotiated or when an existing agreement is
extended after November 7, 2000.
The Measure 95 Explanatory Statement states that, for the purposes of the
measure, '"public schools' include public elementary schools, public
secondary schools, community colleges, state colleges and state universities,
and all state and local institutions that provide education for patients or
inmates."
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II. BACKGROUND
Public schools systems have been struggling to transform themselves for over
a decade. Changes in our economy and society have led to demands for
higher academic standards, better student performance, and greater
accountability of schools and teachers. In response, Oregon, and many other
states, have adopted and are trying to implement significant education
reforms.
Some education reformers, politicians, and citizens advocate applying a
similar results-based approach to teacher compensation. The thinking is that
teachers who are more effective at teaching should be rewarded and paid
more. Proponents of compensation reforms believe that financial bonuses
will push teachers to develop and apply their skills more effectively and
thereby raise student achievement.
This section of our report provides some basic background information to
help Club members better understand Measure 95's likely impacts. This
section discusses broader trends that affect the demand for and quality of
teachers, the evolution of the current system of teacher compensation,
current experiments around the county in alternative pay-for-performance
models, and the existing teacher compensation system in Oregon.
The Broader Context
One of the major challenges facing school districts in Oregon and across the
country is how to attract, maintain and develop high-quality and effective
teachers. Recent education reforms and higher standards require teachers to
have deeper subject knowledge and better teaching skills. At the same time,
schools and teachers are being asked to handle a wider variety of more complex student problems including violence, emotional and health problems,
drug use, and poverty.
Educators and the public have recently become more aware of the importance of teacher quality. Recent studies have shown that one year with a poor
quality teacher can hinder a student's academic performance for years afterwards.
Schools across the nation need a lot more teachers. The population of students is growing as a result of a baby "boomlet." As the number of students
grows, many states also are attempting to reduce class sizes. Some school
districts and states around the country are already trying to hire away good
teachers from other communities. At the same time schools are under pressure to raise salaries, policy makers are often unwilling to allocate more
funding without greater accountability for good quality performance by
teachers.
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Attracting good quality new teachers may be difficult. Teachers at the top of
their profession earn $15,000 to $20,000 less than college graduates in other
fields with similar responsibilities. The Oregonian reports that in Portland
teacher pay ranges from $27,888 (bachelor's degree with no teaching
experience) to $40,644 (Master's degree and six years' experience), and tops
out at $59,673 (doctoral degree and 13 years of experience).
Critics say that schools of education currently do not adequately prepare
teachers to be effective in the classroom. In many other industrialized
countries, new teachers receive mentoring and other support during first
years of teaching. In the U.S. system, new teachers receive little support and
a large number leave the profession within the first three to five years.
The challenge is clear. How can schools attract, motivate, and retain enough
good teachers to staff the classrooms, meet society's evolving goals for
education, and ensure that teachers continue to teach effectively throughout
their careers.
Evolution of Teacher Compensation in the U.S.
Teacher compensation has gone through a number of different phases over
the past century. Into the late 1800s, teachers were hired by a local
community and worked primarily for room and board. In the early 1900s, the
nation's growing industries developed bureaucratic organizational structures
and position-based salary systems. Schools followed suit. Teachers were
required to have higher levels of education. Elementary school teachers were
paid less than secondary school teachers, and women and minority teachers
were paid less than non-minority males.
The single-salary schedule, still in place today, emerged in the early 20th
century. Overt discrimination in pay and a strong demand for greater
teaching skills led to a system that paid the same salary to teachers with the
same qualifications. A teacher's pay, then and now, depended on objective
measures of years of experience, educational degrees, and additional college
course work. The system was intended to be objective, measurable, and not
subject to whims of school administrators or politicians.
During the 1970s and 1980s, many school districts experimented with "merit
pay" programs that provided additional pay to individual high performing
teachers. These programs suffered from a lack of objective standards and
assessment methods. The decision about which teacher would receive merit
pay was generally based on subjective performance reviews by school
administrators. Teachers ended up competing for a limited pot of merit pay
funding, creating a divisive and competitive environment in schools.
Funding was often inadequate, and teacher compensation was not well
linked to overall school strategies or goals.
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In 1960, 10 percent of school districts in the country reported the use of
some type of merit pay system. A 1978 survey showed that number had
dropped to 4 percent, with half of those gone within five years. By the mid1980s only 1 percent of teachers worked under a merit pay system. Merit pay
proposals continue to be viewed negatively by many educators.
The single-salary system is still the dominant method used to compensate
teachers in Oregon and across the nation. Advantages of this system are that
it is very predictable and objective, it is simple to understand, and allows
school districts to easily project and budget labor costs. Critics of the system
say teacher quality and effectiveness does not necessarily increase with years
of service. Teachers can receive additional pay for college courses not related
to the needs of their school or students. Critics say the single-salary system
does not reward teachers who are particularly effective or provide incentives
for teachers whose performance is only adequate, or sanctions for those
whose performance is poor.
A New Approach—Pay for Performance
In recent years, interest has grown in compensation systems that would
reward teachers for their actual knowledge and teaching skills rather than
years of service and education. A number of school districts and state
governments are exploring different models of performance-based
compensation systems.
A major national source of research and information on performance based
compensation for teachers is the Teacher Compensation Project at the
Consortium for Policy Research in Education at the University of WisconsinMadison. This federally-financed program draws on the education research
programs at five major U.S. universities. The Project has prepared detailed
case studies of a number of pay-for-performance models around the country.
(www.wcer.wisc.edu/cpre/teachercomp/). These models generally fall into
two major categories: skills and knowledge based systems, and student
performance based systems.
Skills and Knowledge Based Compensation: This model is based on
evidence that effective teaching requires teachers to be proficient in a certain
range of skills and knowledgeable in the subject area that they teach.
Teachers are assessed and receive bonuses for each area of proficiency. In
some programs teachers can receive up to $15,000 in bonus pay in addition
to their regular salaries. (The Vaughn Next Century Learning Center in Los
Angeles is a charter school that has developed one of the most interesting
examples of this type of program. See article by Jeff Archer, "Changing the
Rules of the Game," Education Week, June 14, 2000).
Some schools have based their teacher evaluation and compensation programs on the research of Charlotte Danielson, author of an influential 1996
book, Enhancing Professional Practice: A Framework for Teaching.
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Danielson's research identified 22 skill areas that promote improved student
learning. These are grouped into four areas: Planning and Preparation, The
Classroom Environment; Instruction; and Professional Responsibilities.
(http://www.ascd.org/readingroom/books/danielson96book.html)
Another measure of teacher skill is a teacher certification program
administered by the National Board of Professional Teaching Standards
(NBPTS). Many states and school districts around the country provide
substantial bonuses to teachers who achieve NBPTS certification. The NBPTS
grants national certification to outstanding teachers who complete a
rigorous application and review process. An Education Week article from
October 1999 reported that 23 states and about 85 school districts offer
bonuses to teachers who receive NBPTS certification.
(NBPTS is an independent, nonprofit, nonpartisan organization governed by
a 63-member board of directors. Most board members are classroom
teachers, others are school administrators, school board leaders, governors
and state legislators, higher education officials, teacher union leaders, and
business and community leaders. Visit http://www.nbpts.org/nbpts/ for
more information).
Student Performance Based Compensation: Some districts offer bonuses
based on student performance. Almost all of these are "school-based"
programs that measure the overall performance of all the students in a
school—they do not measure performance by the students of a single
teacher. If the overall academic performance of a school's students improves
more than a set amount, the school receives a bonus. In some cases the
bonus is given to and spent by the school as a whole. In others, it is divided
up among all individual faculty and staff members.
Proponents of school-based awards say they recognize and reward the team
effort required to improve student performance. Critics say individual
teacher bonuses can be divisive, can divert teaching time to efforts to
improving test scores, and can lead to falsification of test results.
Our committee founds only two school districts that link bonuses for
individual teachers to improvements in the performance of that teacher's
students over a school year.
Denver School District: In September 1999, the Denver School Board
approved a two-year pilot program which rewards teacher's based on
improvements in the performance of his or her students. School
participation in the program is voluntary and requires support from 85
percent of the faculty. Twelve elementary schools and three middle schools
volunteered to participate. The schools were divided into three groups. A
different approach is used to evaluate student performance with each group
of schools. Student performance is judged on:
• the Iowa Test of basic skills, or
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• tests and classroom work given by the teacher, or
• improvements in classrooms where teachers take professional
development courses to improve their skills.
Teachers in the pilot schools receive $500 for participating in the program
and an additional $1,000 if the majority of the teacher's students show
improvement by the end of the year.
Colonial School District (Pennsylvania): In August 1999, the Colonial School
District implemented a system of individual teacher and group achievement
awards. Individual teachers are ranked according to how their students' test
scores compare to those of a similar teacher's students. When comparison
scores are not available, teachers are ranked relative to the rest of their
comparison group on the basis of a portfolio of measures. The measures are
determined by school district administrators and reviewed by an
independent educational consultant.
Teachers can earn bonuses if their entire department is rated as
"outstanding." Teachers can also earn bonuses if they, as individuals, are
ranked as outstanding. Outstanding teachers are selected by a panel that
includes an independent educational consultant, the school superintendent,
and a teachers' association representative. Of the total number of teachers,
10 percent (but no more than 20 percent), must be ranked as outstanding.
Individual awards are calculated by dividing the total amount of money
available for bonuses by the number of outstanding teachers. The bonuses
range from $1300 to $2800 per year.
Our committee found no examples of states or school districts that
determine an individual teacher's base compensation on the performance of
his or her students—the system proposed by Measure 95.
Measuring Individual Teacher Impact on Student Performance
Measure 95's sponsors said they based the measure on the availability of a
sophisticated assessment system used in Tennessee and the use of a more
basic assessment program in North Carolina.
Tennessee: The Tennessee Value-Added Assessment System (TVAAS) was
developed by Dr. William Sanders in the early 1990s as part of a broad
education reform in Tennessee. The reform included a significant increase in
state education funding. The assessment system responded to the
legislature's demand for both strong accountability and evidence that
funding was being spent in a way that actually improved student
performance.
The TVAAS tracks a student's test scores over a few years and establishes a
projection of academic improvement. The system compares actual
performance to the projection. The system aggregates student
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performance results across many students and uses a very sophisticated and
complex methodology to isolate out the impact of a particular school or
teacher on a student's performance. The system is designed to compensate
for a variety of real world complexities and factors.
In the early years of the program, all students in grades 2 through 8 were
tested each year in five subjects-math, reading, language arts, science and
social studies. Math tests were later added for high school students. Other
subject area tests are planned.
Our committee talked about the program with Benjamin Brown, the director
of evaluation and assessment for the Tennessee Department of Education.
He said the TVAAS is an excellent assessment tool and has been found to be
very accurate. Its greatest strength is its ability to measure the impact of
individual teachers on student performance. He warned that the system,
requires an equally high quality testing system to generate the data used in
the analysis.
Mr. Brown said TVAAS is a strong tool for diagnosis. The results can correlate
performance problems with an individual school or teacher. The results can
even show how effective teachers are at teaching different subjects or at
teaching to different groups of students in their classes.
The TVAAS results are kept confidential. Only the teacher and the principal
see the results. (Another copy is kept on file with the school district.)
Teachers use the results to improve their own performance. Principals use
the results to work with individual teachers or to reassign teachers to tasks
that better draw on their strengths.
Tennessee school districts do not use the TVAAS to determine teacher
compensation. Teachers are paid primarily on the traditional single-salary
system based on seniority and education.
North Carolina: The North Carolina General Assembly adopted a statewide
student assessment program in 1996. The program tracks changes in performance for individual students and measures the "amount of student learning during the year that is attributable to the school." The system tests elementary students on reading and math skills, and uses multiple choice tests
and an essay test to evaluate student learning in eleven subject areas. In a
few years, the system will begin to calculate expected average improvement
in student performance and compare it to actual improvement by individual
students.
The North Carolina program ranks schools in five levels from "exemplary
schools" to "low performing schools" and those that "violated testing
requirements." The program does not tie student performance to individual
teacher pay or bonuses. Our committee was not able to determine whether
the program has led to improved student performance.
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Principles for Teacher Compensation Reform
The CPRE Teacher Compensation Project has identified ten key process principles that are important to the successful development, design, and implementation of a new compensation system. These principles are:
1. Involvement of all key parties, and especially those whose
compensation is being affected. This is the preeminent principle
for successfully changing compensation policies. Teacher unions,
administrators, school boards and the public all should be
centrally involved in the process of development, design and
implementation.
2. Broad agreement on the most valued educational results is also
crucial. All parties-teachers, administrators, board members,
parents and the public-need to agree on the results that are most
valued.
3. Sound comprehensive evaluation systems need to be in place to
assess teacher knowledge and skill development in a skill-based
pay system, and to evaluate organizational products and processes
to be rewarded through group based performance awards.
Assessment mechanisms might include measures of student
achievement, parent satisfaction, and teacher and administrator
skills, knowledge, and performance.
4. Adequate funding that is integrated within the school finance
structure is less likely to be vulnerable to cuts than a separate
funding pool. Lack of funding and a lack of a long-term funding
commitment have been key aspects of the downfall of many efforts
to reform compensation in education. Transition funds often are
needed to move from the old to the new structure and
performance bonuses need a stable funding pool.
5. Investments in ongoing professional development are key to
knowledge- and skill-based pay structures. Such investments
should be in the range of 2-3 percent of the operating budget.
6. Quotas should be avoided. All schools meeting performance
improvement targets should be rewarded, not just a fixed
percentage of schools. Organizational excellence is dependent on
consistent rewards for improvements in performance.

1n

7. General conditions of work must be addressed. The better the
conditions of work in a school (teacher involvement in decisionmaking, sound facilities, availability of materials, safety, etc.), the
more likely a new form of compensation can be implemented
successfully. A corollary to this principle is that the compensation
system should be designed with the general conditions of work in
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mind. For example, skills assessment in a high-involvement school
should incorporate teachers fully in the assessment process.
8. Management maturity is also important. Administrators and the
school board should have good working relationships, and the
administration should develop a history of working cooperatively
with teachers and their unions to further system goals and
objectives. Restructuring of the salary schedule should occur in an
environment characterized by interest-based bargaining, in which
each party recognizes the interests and concerns of the other
parties.
9. Labor maturity goes hand-in-hand with the behavior of the
administration. Teacher associations, and their members, need to
have positive commitment to the academic goals of the school,
good working relationships among themselves, and a tradition of
working with management toward education system key goals.
10. Persistence until the plan is "perfected" is the key to long-term
success. Most plans have initial "bugs" and are viewed with
skepticism by some employees. Thus, persistence is needed to
continue implementation, to revise the plan when problems are
identified, and to encourage full participation to see how the plan
works when fully implemented.
(http://www.wcer. wisc.edu./cpre/teachercomp/tchrcomp/tcprocess.htm)
Current Teacher Compensation System in Oregon
Teacher compensation in Oregon is left entirely up to local school districts.
Local districts establish their compensation systems through collective
bargaining. All the teacher compensation systems in Oregon are based on
the single-salary model—years of service and educational level. Teachers
receive automatic pay increases within that structure.
Some Oregon districts, including Portland Public Schools, experimented with
merit pay during the mid-1970s and early 1980s. By the mid-1980s, the
programs were abandoned for the same reasons that merit pay programs
failed across the country.
Teacher Tenure: From 1973 to 1997, Oregon teachers achieved tenure after
completing a three-year probation period. Teachers could only be fired for a
handful of specific reasons. School administrators were required to document these reasons and give teachers a chance to correct the problems by
participating in an "assistance plan." Teachers dismissed after completing an
assistance plan could appeal their dismissal to the Fair Dismissal Appeals
Board. In 1997, the Oregonian reported that while "most cases [were] settled
before reaching the Board, administrators [had] complained for years that
the process [could] take years and cost tens of thousands of dollars."
15
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1997 SB 880: In 1997, the Oregon Legislature passed Senate Bill 880, which
eliminated teacher tenure and put teachers on a two-year renewable contract. The bill streamlined the process for dismissing teachers who do not
meet standards and required districts to consider a teacher's ability to teach
a course, not just seniority, in making layoffs. Under SB880, the contracts of
teachers who are doing well are renewed automatically. Teachers who are
having problems are notified by their district and given the opportunity to
correct the problem through participation in an assistance plan. If the problems are not corrected the teacher is dismissed.
A representative of the Oregon School Boards Association reported that the
number of teacher dismissals has not increased since the passage of SB880.
He said the number of teachers participating in, and successfully
completing, assistance plans has increased. A representative of the Oregon
Education Association estimated that 30 teachers were dismissed last year,
out of approximately 30,000 public schools teachers in Oregon.
SB 880 did not affect teacher pay. While this legislation has affected the way
districts evaluate teacher performance for the purpose of contract renewal,
teacher compensation in almost every school district in Oregon continues to
be based solely on years of service and education level.
Some Oregon school districts have developed sophisticated performance
evaluation systems that evaluate teacher proficiency in set of skills, similar to
those identified by Charlotte Danielson. These performance evaluations do
not affect a teacher's pay.
Oregon Experiments with Pay for Performance
Only a few Oregon school districts are experimenting with some limited
forms of pay for performance. Three districts provide bonuses to teachers
who receive NBPTS certification (Sweet Home, Gresham-Barlow, and Eagle
Point). These bonuses vary from a one-time $10,000 bonus to a permanent
$5,000 increase to a teachers base salary.
The Central Linn School District is the only Oregon district that has
incorporated skill- and knowledge-based criteria into its pay structure. To
receive step or merit pay increases, individual teachers must meet certain
professional development goals. Teachers can advance through four levels
(basic, standard, advanced and master)—each level has three pay steps. To
advance to the next level, teachers must meet goals that include: a bachelor
degree and then a master's degree, earning a license in a second subject area,
completing progressively advanced proficiency requirements, and mentoring
and leading other teachers. Teachers that do not meet the requirements to
advance to the next level receive only cost-of-living increases.
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III. ARGUMENTS PRO AND CON
A. Arguments Advanced in Favor of the Measure

Proponents offered the following arguments in favor of Measure 95:
• Research shows that teacher quality has a very powerful impact on
student achievement. But with today's method of teacher
compensation, we often lose our best teachers and retain those who
are least effective.
• Basing teacher pay on student performance will attract better
teachers, recognize teachers doing good work, and result in more
learning.
• In Oregon, teachers are rewarded for postgraduate work and length
of time teaching, rather than for getting results in the classroom.
The result is that better teachers tend to move on to other
professions. Studies have shown that those who score highest on
measures of academic ability are most likely to leave teaching early,
and that those who score lowest are most likely to remain.
• The studies seem to show that good teachers are as important as
parental involvement in boosting student achievement. It isn't right
that a teacher who is deadwood gets paid as much as a teacher who
is talented and really connected with the students.
• For nearly three decades, researchers have known that rewarding
teachers in proportion to experience and graduate education does
not contribute to gains in student achievement.
• Student test scores are higher in states that have taken steps to
improve teacher quality. North Carolina, which offers financial
rewards for improved performance, has had the largest student
achievement gains in math and reading of any state over the past
decade.
• Currently, when teacher layoffs occur, retention of teachers is based
on length of employment, rather than on competence of the
teacher.
• This initiative requires a teacher's compensation and job security to
be based on the increase in students' appropriate knowledge while
under that teacher's instruction.
• Recognizing that disruptive students can hamper the learning
ability of an entire class, Measure 95 also authorizes teachers to
permanently remove disruptive students from their classrooms.
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B. Arguments Advanced Against the Measure
Opponents offered the following arguments against Measure 95:
• Measure 95 is vague, unworkable, unfair, and expensive. It does not
define student progress or how the progress would be measured, or
give any description of how to implement such a measurement
system.
• The Oregon Constitution, our state's fundamental governing
document, is no place for detailed instructions on how to pay
teachers.
• Measure 95 is an experiment with unknown results. As a
constitutional amendment, it can't be tested, changed and
improved. It makes our children guinea pigs for unproven ideas.
• No other state in the nation has chosen to tie individual teacher pay
to the performance of that teacher's students.
• Measure 95 does nothing to address the real problems in our
schools such as a lack of parental involvement, lack of adequate
funding, inadequate and outdated materials, overcrowded classes,
and violence on school campuses.
• Measure 95 is a risky scheme that takes millions of dollars away
from our schools real need—adequate funding. It doesn't put back
lost programs. It doesn't decrease class sizes. It doesn't even
improve student learning.
• Teaching is a group effort. Tying student performance to individual
educators is the wrong way to go. It creates competition, rather than
cooperation, and that's destructive in a school setting.
• Basing teachers' pay on the performance of their students on
standardized tests is just not fair! Student achievement and
academic performance are part of a larger equation that includes
student motivation, parental involvement and quality teachers.
Measure 95 has nothing to do with any of these things.
• Measure 95 does not promote critical thinking or a well-rounded
curriculum that prepares students for the new century. It sets up a
system where standardized test scores are the only way to measure
the performance of a student. It gives no indication how progress
will be measured in special education, physical education or other
electives.
.„

• Measure 95 does nothing to help schools get rid of inadequate
teachers. The Oregon Legislature has ended teacher tenure and our
schools have the tools to get rid of bad teachers.
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• Measure 95 could easily discourage a teacher who wants to work in
difficult and challenging situations, such as working with students
with severe special needs.
• No two students are alike. Measure 95 says student progress must
be identical for a teacher to be successful. That is unfair and
unrealistic. Measure 95 will leave our at-risk and special needs
students behind.
• Measure 95 will impose a new, elaborate, and costly testing system
for every classroom in Oregon from kindergarten through graduate
school. It will cost taxpayers $47 million dollars to implement and
$22 million dollars a year to administer. Think of how many
teachers our schools could hire or how many new books or
computers we could buy with that money.
• Measure 95 creates more bureaucracy instead of letting local school
districts work with principals, teachers, parents and school boards
to find their own answers.
• Under Measure 95, teachers will have to spend hours of their time
filling out needless paperwork that has nothing to do with learning.
IV. DISCUSSION

What is the Problem?
Teacher quality is clearly one of the most important factors in student
performance. At the same time, teachers do not control many of the outside
factors that influence an individual student's readiness, willingness, and
ability to learn. Large class sizes, inadequate materials and facilities, and
other external pressures can also impede the learning process. However,
questions remain: Are teachers being as effective as they can be in the areas
over which they do have control? And what role can a compensation system
play in rewarding effective teaching and simulating teacher development?
A 1999 study by the Education Trust [Good Teaching Matters: How WellQualified Teachers Can Close the Gap) synthesized research that shows that
teachers are the single most significant factor in student achievement. The
author, Kati Haycock, argues that the best investment states and districts can
make, especially for poor and minority students, is assuring a well-qualified
teacher for every child.
Critics of the current education system say teacher quality is hindered by:
inappropriate training in schools of education, lack of adequate support and
guidance for new teachers, lack of meaningful and effective professional
development opportunities, and low pay compared to other comparable
college graduates. They say teacher salaries are not linked to organizational
needs. They call for a system that "recognizes deep technical expertise, 1 Q
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which is increasingly needed, and provides salary increases when teachers
learn the content knowledge and pedagogical strategies needed to teach a
more rigorous curriculum well to all students." (CPRE, "Why Change Teacher
Compensation?")
Witnesses told our committee that there are excellent teachers who feel a
deep passion for their work. Many other teachers generally have good skills
and are reasonably effective. Other teachers do not have adequate knowledge
in the subject area they teach. Some do not have skills that are well suited to
helping students achieve higher academic standards. Some have simply lost
their enthusiasm or interest in teaching.
We saw some evidence that school districts in Oregon and elsewhere in the
nation are developing more sophisticated evaluation systems to give
teachers useful feedback on their performance. We were not able to
determine the extent to which these programs improve teacher or student
performance
There is some evidence of a public perception that school districts do not do
enough to ensure that teachers have adequate skills throughout their careers.
Some people feel that teachers earn more pay for simply staying with the job
and for getting more education credits, even if those credits are not related to
the needs of their students or their school. Some studies we saw found that
increased teacher seniority and education level do not have a strong
correlation with more effective teaching after the first five years of a teacher's
career.
We heard that the current teacher compensation system in Oregon does not
encourage or support meaningful performance evaluation or reward
teachers who are already effective or who improve their effectiveness.
Is Pay for Performance a Desirable Alternative?
The current single-schedule compensation system has some significant
benefits. The system evolved over many decades and has survived many
attempts at reform. It is seen by many teachers and administrators as fair,
equitable, predictable, and easy to understand. The current system makes it
easy for school districts to budget labor costs. An OEA representative said the
current system works well for most teachers and administrators. He said
groups inside the education system are not asking for a major change to the
compensation system.
Some education reformers argue that a new compensation structure is
needed that would pay teachers for the skills needed to produce high
education performance. In such a system the best-paid teachers would be
those with the deepest and broadest array of professional expertise. They say
that education reform programs around the country are emphasizing new
standards-based, results-oriented norms and values. They say teacher
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compensation systems need to be aligned with the same principles and
values.
Past experiments with merit pay systems have failed primarily because,
rewards were based on subjective decisions, teachers were not given clear
goals, no good objective mechanisms existed to measure a teacher's impact
on student performance, the programs were inadequately funded, and,
systems caused teachers to compete for a limited pool of bonus money.
Current experiments with performance pay could provide interesting
insights into the effectiveness of the new approaches at improving student
performance. States and school districts outside Oregon appear to be
proceeding cautiously. Some are gathering more information through pilot
projects. Others have left the traditional compensation system in place but
give teachers the opportunity to earn bonuses based on their skills and
knowledge or student performance.
Allan Odden, director of the CPRE Teacher Compensation project, told the
Oregonian that he "doesn't advocate that teacher pay be based solely on
student achievement." He agrees "with most educators that teaching is a
group effort, and tying student performance to individual educators is the
wrong way to go. It creates competition, rather than cooperation, and that's
destructive in a school setting...."
Is Oregon's System likely to change without Measure 95
Without the passage of Measure 95, Oregon's current teacher compensation
system will likely remain in place. Change will happen when proponents of
changing the pay system can convince school boards and administrators that
a performance pay system is sound policy and that it can be implemented
fairly and economically. Teacher unions are generally opposed to pay for
performance reforms. An OEA representative said the union is willing to
consider certain school-based award programs (where all teachers and staff
share a bonus when overall school performance improves) and
non-monetary awards for excellence.
Our committee found no evidence that any effort is underway to explore
opportunities for broad reform of the teacher compensation system. The
legislature apparently is not pursuing the issue. Nor is the Oregon
Department of Education. School district administrators feel they are being
squeezed so tightly financially that they cannot risk adopting a pay system
that adds uncertainty into their budgets. The Oregon School Board
Association provides technical support to any districts that want to learn
about pay for performance compensation options.
While education is at the forefront of public debate, other aspects of that
debate seem to dominate. Adequate funding, class-size, "accountability," etc.
all have a place on the agenda and supporters within the educational
establishment. Our committee found no organized support for Measure
95 beyond the chief petitioners. Measure 95 has drawn public attention to 21
the teacher compensation system, but support has yet to follow.
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Evaluation of Measure 95 Against CPRE Principles
The CPRE provided some useful guidelines for the successful reform of a
teacher compensation system. We applied these guidelines to evaluate
Measure 95 below:
1. Involvement of all key parties. Measure 95 was developed without
consultation with or input from any of the affected parties. If
Measure 95 passes, school districts, administrators, and teachers
will have the opportunity to work together to develop new
compensation programs that comply with Measure 95.
2. Broad agreement on the most valued educational results.
Teachers, administrators, board members, parents and the public
were not involved in establishing the results on which
compensation would be based under Measure 95. Measure 95
requires that the basis for compensation be the increase in
students "appropriate knowledge." It appears that compensation
could not be patterned after the most promising models from
other states—teacher knowledge and skills, or school-wide
performance. Under Measure 95 each district could work with
other affected parties to define what would constitute "appropriate
knowledge." This could lead to disparities from one community to
the next in how teacher pay is determined.
3. Sound comprehensive evaluation systems. No district in Oregon
or elsewhere in the nation currently has a system that would
provide the evaluation data needed to implement Measure 95.
Measure 95 opponents argue that standardized tests would need to
be developed and administered to all students in all classes from
K-12 through graduate school. Measure 95 proponents say
standardized tests are not necessary. They envision students being
tested at the beginning of the school year on topics to be covered,
then re-tested at the end of the year to see how much they've
learned. Proponents claim that districts could generate this
information with mechanisms similar to the TVAAS or the student
performance evaluation used in North Carolina. Neither of these
systems are currently used to determine individual teacher
compensation.
4. Adequate funding. Measure 95 does not propose an add-on bonus
program. It proposes that all funding of teacher salaries be
distributed based on improvements in student "appropriate
knowledge." Additional funds would be needed to help districts
develop and transition to a new compensation system, and to
develop and maintain the extensive new evaluation programs.
__

5. Investments in ongoing professional development are key to
knowledge. Measure 95 would not allow the development of
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skill-based pay structures. The measure would not prohibit a
parallel system of teacher skill evaluation and targeted
professional development. The cost of developing and maintaining
both systems would be high.
6. Quotas should be avoided. Measure 95 would not appear to allow
quotas (e.g. bonuses for the top 10 percent of teachers or schools).
Every teacher's pay would have to be based on the performance of
his or her students.
7. General conditions of work. Measure 95 does not address work
conditions (e.g. teacher involvement in decision-making, sound
facilities, availability of materials, safety, etc.). School districts
could consider these conditions as they develop their new
compensation systems.
8. Management maturity. Measure 95 does not address this issue. It
does not prevent administrators and the school board from
developing good working relationships or from working
cooperatively with teachers and their unions to further system
goals and objectives.
9. Labor maturity. Measure 95 does not address this issue. It does
not prevent teacher associations, and their members, from
developing a positive commitment to the academic goals of the
school, good working relationships among themselves, and a
tradition of working with management toward the key goals of the
education system.
10. Persistence. Because Measure 95 proposes a constitutional
amendment, it is much less subject to change than a statutory
measure. While it allows some flexibility on how districts define
and measure student performance, it would not allow a district to
adopt other more promising skill and knowledge based
compensation reforms.
Issues Over How Measure 95 Would Work
The language of Measure 95 makes it difficult to assess how it would work.
Clearly, Measure 95 ties teacher job performance to student
performance. What the measure does not attempt to address is how to
measure student performance. Proponents have argued that student
achievement should be assessed in a manner similar to those states where
performance pay has been adopted, such as Tennessee (where the TVAAS has
achieved a fair measure of success). Some opponents have countered that
teacher pay will necessarily be tied to a currently undetermined (and unfair)
"standardized" method of student testing. In fact, the measure does not
require either method, nor does it preclude any particular means of
measuring student performance.
2o
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Likely, if Measure 95 passes, teacher pay will be based on some measure of
standardized test, as the opponents argue. For grades K-12, Oregon already
tests students under statewide assessments to measure for certificate of
initial mastery and benchmarks. These tests are administered in the 3rd, 5th,
8th, and 10th grades—not every year. In addition, Portland Public Schools
has implemented Portland Achievement Levels Tests to measure student
skills for various purposes. In conjunction with statewide assessments,
teachers maintain portfolios of student performance in various areas.
Although these measures fall far short of providing a comprehensive gauge of
K-12 student performance, and they do nothing for testing on a post-high
school level. It is possible that school districts may adopt a standardized
testing and portfolio model not unlike the current statewide assessment
system for the purpose of measuring student performance as it relates to
teacher pay.
Mr. Brown, from Tennessee, cautioned that developing and administering a
testing system that would cover every subject and every class from
kindergarten to graduate school would be logistically challenging and very
expensive. Some areas of instruction, such as special education, may require
more sophisticated testing. Tests will have to be developed, even for subjects
or levels of classes that may only apply to a couple hundred students
statewide. Different testing approaches are likely to be needed in elementary
schools compared to high schools or universities.
Mr. Brown advised that tests should be revised every year. Otherwise copies
of the questions could get out, or teachers narrow their teaching to questions
on past tests. Security of test questions could be a problem if all schools
across the state do not take the tests on the same day. Students or teachers
could easily distribute questions over the Internet. This is also costly.
Schools will also have to block out time in the school schedule to administer
the tests. Mr. Brown questioned whether students would feel they had any
stake in the results, if they know the tests are to determine teacher pay, not
their own grade.
It is important to remember that Measure 95 does not mandate any
particular means of measuring a student's appropriate knowledge. Therefore,
while some argue that local district control—already eroded under 1990
Measure 5 and 1997 Measure 50—may be further jeopardized by a state-wide
teacher compensation method, local control may in fact be enhanced.
Measure 95 does not mandate that student performance for the purposes of
teacher pay be determined on a statewide basis. In fact, teacher performance
could be determined district by district, without state supervision or
university by university for post-high school institutions.
What apparently is not in dispute, however, is that the measure will cost substantial sums to implement. Although the proponents base their support of
the measure in part on the TVAAS system, it is important to note that TVAAS
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was implemented as part of a broad-based education reform package in
Tennessee that included increased funding for that state's public education
system. Measure 95 does not allocate any new spending for implementation;
and no matter what means is used to measure student knowledge, the cost
will further stretch the limited resources currently available for public
education.
Finally, merit pay systems have failed in the past for lack of proper planning
and unified support from all stakeholders, including school boards,
administrators and (especially) teachers. The committee could find no
support for this "performance" pay measure from any interested educational
association. In light of that fact, the question of how this measure will work
might best be answered by the historical record. Viewed from that
perspective, the question really is not: What benefits are lost by this
measure's failure? But rather, "What risks to student achievement are posed
by its passage?"
City Club Initiative Criteria
Measure 95 amends the Oregon Constitution. The City Club has a position
that ordinary statutory matter should not be placed into the Oregon
Constitution {The Initiative and Referendum in Oregon, City Club of Portland,
1996). Appropriate matters for constitutional amendments are those that are
related to structure, organization and powers of government, and the rights
of the people with respect to their government. Teacher pay and assessment
matters can and should be addressed through statutory changes.
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V. CONCLUSIONS

The committee believes that Measure 95 falls short of adopting the processes
necessary to implement a successful performance-based pay structure.
Studies in other states where performance pay has been adopted reveal that
itsucceeds only if coupled with systematic changes to the entire educational
system. The process of implementing such reforms normally includes
consensus among all stakeholders regarding educational improvements and
outcomes, and sound evaluation and assessment systems for both teacher
and student performance. In addition, the experience of other states shows
that performance pay reform must recognize and fund the additional
significant cost of the changing from the old system to the new system.
While the members of the committee differ on whether tying teacher pay to
performance is a good idea, they unanimously agree, based on the historical
record, that the measure is likely doomed to failure since it lacks two of the
three critical elements necessary for effective reform: agreed upon
measurement standards and adequate funding.
As a substantive matter, the committee faults the measure's reliance on
student performance as the sole measure for teacher pay. Other states'
reform programs measure a variety of teacher performance factors, and not
just student achievement. No other state has chosen to base teacher pay
solely on student performance.
The committee is mindful of public perception that there is a current crisis in
public education and that new teacher skills are required for students to
succeed. It acknowledges recent national trends which emphasize
accountability and behavior-based compensation systems in employment.
The committee shares the proponent's intrigue with elements of performance based pay concepts. We recognize the validity of reforms in other
states that incorporate those ideas in teacher pay structures.
The committee believes, for example, that the general (perhaps vague)
language of the measure (while susceptible to debate and perhaps litigation)
may provide enough flexibility for districts and universities to craft pay
criteria suitable to address local concerns. However, the committee feels that
any potential benefits presented by the measure are outweighed by the risk
of disrupting Oregon's already overburdened and underfunded educational
system, especially in light of the fact no educational association interviewed
supported the measure.
However, the committee strongly believes that Oregon should take note of
performance pay reform efforts in other states. The legislature or the
Governor's office should delegate a study group to review elements of such
reform programs. In addition, the committee believes that the City Club
should create a study committee to explore teacher pay-for-performance
issues and models.
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Some members of this committee embrace the concept that that the best
teachers (if they can be fairly identified) should receive the best pay. Others
reject the underlying premise because they feel that teachers are not
motivated to excel through salary incentives.
If, and only if, a pay system different from the current matrix is to work, it
must first be the product of a collaborative process that includes those most
affected —teachers—and it must be supported by strong leadership at all
levels, including the school board, administration, and the teachers. We are
all united in our opposition to Ballot Measure 95 because it will not work.
VI. RECOMMENDATIONS
Your Committee unanimously recommends a NO vote on Measure 95.
Respectfully submitted,
Shirley Deale
Jennifer Peet
Chuck Stuckey
Candace Thornley
David Simon, chair
Paul Millius, research advisor
Paul Leistner, research director
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VII. APPENDICES
A. WITNESS LIST
• Morgan Allen, No on 95 Campaign
• Boyd Applegarth, retired, former Beaverton School District Superintendent
• Benjamin Brown, executive director for evaluation and assessment,
Tennessee Department of Education
• Richard Garrett, president, Portland Teachers Association
• Becky Miller, Oregon Taxpayers United
• Russell Panter, high school english teacher, Sherwood School District
• James Sager, president, Oregon Education Association
• Ron Wilson, director, Human Resource Development, Oregon School Board
Association
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